Is David Sussman against torture? According to my understanding, he thinks torture is wrong, but he allows it as long as it does not involve...

David Sussman sets out a comprehensive case against torture in his article "What's Wrong With Torture?" Sussman's position is nuanced. He makes clear that he has no categorical objections to torture; what he does believe is that it bears an extremely high burden of justification, higher even than the act of killing.

Sussman's main concern can be described as a variant of the concerns that spring from Kantian ethics. In relation to torture, Kantianism would...

David Sussman sets out a comprehensive case against torture in his article "What's Wrong With Torture?" Sussman's position is nuanced. He makes clear that he has no categorical objections to torture; what he does believe is that it bears an extremely high burden of justification, higher even than the act of killing.

Sussman's main concern can be described as a variant of the concerns that spring from Kantian ethics. In relation to torture, Kantianism would oppose the practice on the grounds that it constitutes a violation of the individual's moral agency. What is particularly objectionable about torture, for the orthodox Kantian, is that it takes place without the victim's consent. On this reading, the level of pain inflicted upon the victim is of secondary importance.

Sussman criticizes this focus on the denial of a moral agent's ability to govern herself. That is not to say that this is not an important issue, it is just that there is a real danger we can lose sight of the fact that torture actually hurts and the profound moral implications that flow from this. What Sussman finds particularly objectionable about torture is that it forces a victim to betray her own interests, to act as a co-conspirator in her own degradation. The victim of torture is both utterly helpless and complicit in her violation.

Sussman's understanding of torture is relational. It takes place in an asymmetrical relationship in which the victim has no opportunity to put up any moral or legal resistance to her torturer.

A relational examination of torture automatically rules out a utilitarian approach or any other that focuses on the consequences, such as physical pain or psychological damage. Such consequences are indeed important, but by focusing our attention upon them, utilitarianism ignores what Sussman sees as the wider drama, the one-sided conflict involved in the relationship of domination and control enacted by the practice of torture.