How did the U.S. strategize the winning of the Vietnam War using "organized modern technology"?

Historian Howard Zinn is credited with saying, “When the United States fought in Vietnam, it was organized modern technology versus organized human beings, and the human beings won.”

After the signing of the Geneva Agreement in 1954, French forces withdrew from what was then French Indochina. The agreement led to the recognition of communist North Vietnam and formed the new country of South Vietnam. Despite a hegemonic party holding power in the south, the United States supported the non-communist government. Initially US support was focused on economic and strategic aid, not military assistance. Over time there was a mission creep, and US military trainers became combat advisors. Increased pressure from the communist North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and the southern National Liberation Front, or Viet Cong (VC), led to more US military involvement. In 1964 there were approximately 23,000 US troops in Vietnam; just one year later the number was 184,000. With the huge influx of American combat troops came American doctrine.

Facing a dispersed rebellion (VC) and a conventional military front (NVA), U.S. forces had to rely on mobility, firepower, and air superiority. Both the NVA and VC armies were peasant forces, supplied and equipped with Soviet Block weapons, mostly funneled through other communist countries, like China. With a huge local recruiting pool, the communist forces seemed to have an inexhaustible supply of willing recruits. The best “method” to counter numerical superiority was believed to be the application of “organized modern technology.”

The US launched a strategic air campaign reminiscent of the great World War II bombing campaigns. The US established interlocking fire-bases on hilltops; developed a vast network of support bases, forward operating bases, and combat outposts; and assembled an enormous air presence to root out the VC. Utilizing light, small scout helicopters, US commanders sought out hostile troops, initiated contact, and launched large-scale infantry assaults, most commonly using troop-carrying helicopters to identify and eliminate the enemy.

With dynamic battlefield communications, intelligence-gathering, and interlocking support, troops worked together. Infantry troops relied on local artillery pieces, assault helicopters, jet bombers, and, in some cases, naval gunfire support. By utilizing a wide range of combined arms, the technological advantage leveled the battlefield. Multiple captured NVA and VC leaders reported a similar tactical doctrine: “We had to close with the Americans, we always fixed bayonets. By getting close we were able to limit the effectiveness of American artillery and air support.”

Despite a strategic loss, US troops were seldom defeated in force-on-force battles at the tactical level. Instead, the VC and NVA practiced hit and run, guerrilla, ambush, and tunneling tactics to inflict casualties and win a war of attrition. In many ways, the American failure to sustain South Vietnam as a democratic country is analogous to the American victory against the British nearly two hundred years earlier.